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ROBBER DO SOMETHING MORE THAN GESTURE WITH A FL\; I II
IN HIS POCKET IN ORDER TO ELEVATE A ROBBERY T O AN
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
Under Utah's statutory scheme, the definition of dangerous weapon requires niore
than the represcnUI ion ol (in iilciii Because llic pi.mi ILJ igiuigi. of the sLilnlc n/qnius
something in addition to the representation of an item > vesture with a finger in the
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consistent with the language of the statute and does not require that a victim ascertain
whether the robber is actually armed. Instead, such a requirement tracks the language of
the statute and ensures that a distinction between simple and aggravated robbery is
maintained.
As an initial matter, the state's suggestion on page 9-10 of its brief that a gesture
with a finger is sufficient to elevate the crime to aggravated robbery because it creates a
threat of harm disregards the fact that in all robberies, simple or aggravated, there is a
threat of harm. In fact, the crime of robbery explicitly requires that a perpetrator take or
attempt to take property from another by means of force or fear. Utah Code Ann. §76-6301 (2003). While the state is correct that victims do not generally give another person
property unless they feel threatened, victims of simple robberies as well as victims of
aggravated robberies feel threatened. Such a response, however, is not sufficient to
elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery. Instead, the robber must represent that he has
an item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury aw/do something further that
either causes the victim to reasonably believe that the item is likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury or represent that he is in control of such an item. Utah Code Ann. §
76-1-601(5) (2003).
Because the Legislature explicitly included more than just the representation of
an item in its definition of dangerous weapon, rules of statutory construction require that
a robber do more than represent an item in order to elevate a crime to an aggravated
robbery. In interpreting a statute, this Court is required to "'presume that the legislature
used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and
2

accepted meaning.'" See State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ^29, 540 Utah Adv. Rep. 9
(interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (2003) (other citations omitted)). This means
that courts should not interpret a statute so as to render portions of the statute superfluous.
LaBelle v. McKay Dee Hospital Center, 2004 UT 15,1J16, 89 P.3d 113. If a concealed
gesture is considered sufficient to support an aggravated robbery, such an interpretation
of the dangerous weapon statute would render subsections (i) and (ii) as well as the
connector "and" superfluous.
The state apparently agrees that the subjective reaction of the victim should not
control the determination of whether a robbery is elevated to an aggravated robbery.
State's brief at 11, 22-3. In fact, the state devotes a portion of its brief to an argument
that a victim should not be required to verify whether a robber is actually armed. State's
brief at 22-3. Requiring that a robber do something more than represent an item that is
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury in order to aggravate a robbery does not
require that a victim ascertain whether the robber is actually armed. Instead, it requires
an objective assessment of whether the robber acted in a manner that indicated not only
that he had an item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury but also that he
would use that item or otherwise acted in a way that led the victim to reasonably believe
that the item was likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.
Because a gesture with a finger in the pocket, standing alone, does not meet the
definitional requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b), it does not elevate a
robbery to an aggravated robbery.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner/Appellant Ryan Duane Johnson, by and through counsel, respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the decision of the court of appeals and hold that a
concealed gesture in a pocket is not sufficient to elevate a robbery to an aggravated
robbery.

SUBMITTED t h i s ^ d a y of January , 2006.

JOAN C. WATT
DEBRA NELSON
PATRICK ANDERSON
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
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113 P.3d 1028, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 2005'
(Cite as: 113 P.3d 1028, 2005 UT App 209)

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
William Joseph IRELAND, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20040502-CA.
May 12, 2005.
Background: Defendant was convicted
pursuant to conditional plea of guilty in the
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department,
Paul G. Maughan, J., of aggravated robbery.
Defendant appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Billings,
P.J., held that defendant's nonverbal gesture
of pointing his hand inside his coat pocket
close to his right side with his elbow
extended constituted representation of
dangerous weapon, so as to establish
aggravated robbery charge.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
Robbery €=^11
342kl 1 Most Cited Cases
Defendant's nonverbal gesture of pointing
his hand inside his coat pocket close to his
right side with his elbow extended
constituted representation of dangerous
weapon, so as to establish aggravated
robbery charge; dangerous weapon statute,
defining dangerous weapon as including
facsimile or representation of any item
capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury, included nonverbal gestures, gesture
was intended to look like gun for purpose of
influencing sales person to give defendant
all of the cash in cash drawer, and sales
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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person reasonably believed that item was
intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury.
*1028 Michael A. Peterson and Joan C.
Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association,
Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and
Brett J. DelPorto, Assistant Attorney
General, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before BILLINGS, P.J., and DAVIS and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
**1 Defendant William Joseph Ireland
(Ireland) appeals the trial court's judgment
convicting him of aggravated robbery under
Utah Code section 76-6-302. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-302 (2004). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
**2
On December 6, 2003, Jeffrey
Reinkoester (Reinkoester) worked as a sales
person in the Fortier jewelry store in the
Gateway Plaza in Salt Lake City. Ireland
entered the store wearing a thick, puffy coat
and a beanie. Reinkoester greeted Ireland
who responded, "I want you to go and get
me all the money in the cash drawer right
now. I'm not kidding. Hurry." As Ireland
made this demand, he pointed at Reinkoester
with his right hand, which he kept concealed
in the pocket of his coat. Ireland's hand was
held close to his right side with his elbow
extending behind him.
Reinkoester
observed that Ireland gestured like he had a
gun and described Ireland's hand in his coat
pocket as "pointing at [Reinkoester]."
t to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

113 P.3d 1028
113 P.3d 1028, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 2005 UT App 209
(Cite as: 113 P.3d 1028, 2005 UT App 209)
Ireland's hand was "definitely gesturing like
there was a weapon, but it was more subtle."
Ireland made no verbal statement that he had
a gun or weapon, and Reinkoester did *1029
not see a gun, but Reinkoester thought that
Ireland might have a gun due to Ireland's
gesturing in his pocket. Reinkoester thought
he may be shot if he did not comply with
Ireland's request.
**3 Reinkoester walked behind the counter
toward the cash drawer and put what little
cash the store had in a bag. The counter was
too high for Reinkoester to see Ireland's
hands, so Reinkoester could not tell if
Ireland had his hand in his pocket. Holding
up a roll of quarters, Reinkoester asked
Ireland whether he wanted the change and
Ireland responded, "[F]ill it with jewelry."
Before Reinkoester could fill the bag with
jewelry, Ireland said, "[J]ust give it to me,"
grabbed the bag, and ran to the front door.
**4 Meanwhile, Nelson Fortier (Fortier),
the storeowner, realized a robbery was in
progress.
Fortier exited the store and
attempted to block the doors so that Ireland
could not exit.
Ireland pushed and
eventually opened the door. Fortier chased
Ireland and demanded he return the money.
Ireland complied, then ran away, but was
later arrested.
**5 Ireland was charged with one count of
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony
pursuant to Utah Code section 76-6-302, and
theft of services, a class B misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code section 76-6-409.
See Utah Code Ann. § § 76-6-302, -409
(2004). Ireland moved to reduce the charge
of aggravated robbery to simple robbery, a
second degree felony. After a hearing, the
trial court denied the motion.
Ireland
subsequently entered a conditional plea of
guilty to aggravated robbery, reserving the
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right to appeal the denial of his motion.
Ireland now appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
**6 At issue is whether the trial court
properly interpreted Utah Code sections 766-302 and 76-1-601 in convicting Ireland of
aggravated robbery. We review the lower
court's interpretation of statutes for
correctness. See State v. Pixton, 2004 UT
App 275,11 4,98P.3d433.
ANALYSIS
**7 Ireland argues that the trial court erred
by convicting him of aggravated robbery
pursuant to Utah Code sections 76-6-302
and 76-1-601 (the aggravated robbery and
dangerous weapon statutes respectively)
because there was insufficient evidence to
support the conviction. The aggravated
robbery statute provides that "[a] person
commits aggravated robbery if in the course
of committing a robbery, he ... uses or
threatens to use a dangerous weapon as
defined in Section 76-1-601." Utah Code
Ann. $ 76-6-302. The dangerous weapon
statute defines "[djangerous weapon" as
including a "facsimile or representation" of
"any item capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury."
Id. § 76-160U5)(a),(b). Moreover, "the actor's use or
apparent intended use of the item [must]
lead[ ] the victim to reasonably believe the
item is likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury." Id. § 76-1- 601 (5)(b)(i).
**8 Utah courts have upheld convictions
for aggravated crimes when there has been
some kind of verbal representation or threat
that the defendant possessed a dangerous
weapon, even where the defendant did not
display the weapon. See State v. Hartmann,
783 P.2d 544, 547 (Utah 1989) (upholding
conviction for aggravated sexual assault
where defendant raped a woman while

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

113 P.3d 1028
113 P.3d 1028, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 2005 U T App 209
(Cite as: 113 P.3d 1028, 2005 U T App 209)
telling her that he had a gun); State v.
Revos, 2004 UT App 151,11 3, 91 P.3d 861
(upholding aggravated robbery conviction
where defendant yelled, "Get the gun and
shoot," and "shoot to kill" during the
robbery but did not display a weapon); State
v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 277 (Utah
Ct.App.1995)
(upholding
sentence
enhancement for robbery where defendant
claimed to have a gun and threatened to kill
the cashier but did not display or gesture that
he had a weapon); State v. Adams, 830 P.2d
310, 311 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (upholding
aggravated robbery conviction where
defendant verbally threatened to use a gun
while putting his hand on his bulging
pocket).
**9 Ireland argues that the pointing gesture
inside his coat pocket does not constitute a
"representation" because it was not verbal.
We disagree and hold that the statute does
not require a "representation" to be *1030
verbal, but rather includes nonverbal
gestures.
**10 In Candelario, we interpreted the
term "representation" in a similar section of
the Utah Code to include nonverbal actions.
909 P.2d at 278. Specifically, Utah Code
section 76-3-203(2) (the enhancement
statute) provides that a sentence may be
enhanced by one year when " fa dangerous
weapon or a facsimile or the representation
of a dangerous weapon, as provided in
Section 76-1-601' " is used while
committing a second degree felony.
Candelario, 909 P.2d at 278 (emphasis
added) (quoting Utah Code Ann. .§ 76-3203(2) (1995) (amended to what is now
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 (2004))). We
defined "representation" as "an expansive
term," meaning "a statement conveying an
impression for the purpose of influencing
action." IcL_ Moreover, we noted that "[s]uch
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a statement can be either in the form of a
verbal assertion or nonverbal action." Id. at
278 n. 2 (citing Utah R. Evid. 801(a)).
Therefore, we conclude that "representation
of a dangerous weapon" as provided by
section 76-l-601(5)(b) can be in the form of
a nonverbal gesture.JTN1J
FN1. Our conclusion is consistent
with other jurisdictions interpreting
statutory language similar to Utah's.
These jurisdictions have found that
nonverbal
communications
are
sufficient to establish aggravated or
armed robbery charges when the
victim reasonably believes the
defendant has a dangerous weapon.
See State v. Ellison, 169 Ariz. 424,
819 P.2d 1010, 1011. 1012
(Ariz.Ct.App. 1991)
(upholding
defendants' conviction of armed
robbery under Arizona armed
robbery statute where defendants
committed
robberies
by
"simulating] that they had handguns
in their pockets at the time they were
demanding money"); DeLeon v.
State, No. CACR 89-118, 1989 WL
148106, at * 1 , 1989 Ark. App.
LEXIS 608, at *3 (Ark.Ct.App. Dec.
6, 1989) (upholding armed robbery
conviction under Arkansas statute
providing that defendant must
"represent[ ] by word or conduct"
that he is armed with a deadly
weapon where defendant asked for
money while he had his hand in his
pocket and the victim believed
defendant had a weapon or gun in his
pocket); State v. Arena, 235 Conn.
67, 663 A.2d 972, 973, 978 (1995)
(determining defendant's action of
placing an opaque bag on the counter
with an object inside pointing at the
clerk while stating "[p]ut all the

© 2006 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

113 P.3d 1028
113 P.3d 1028, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 2005 UT App 209
(Cite as: 113 P.3d 1028, 2005 UT App 209)
money
in
a bag"
satisfied
Connecticut's armed robbery statute
because defendant "represented by
his words or conduct" that he had a
firearm); State v. Lawrence, No.
9706017912, 2001 WL 1021385, at
*2, 2001 Del-Super. LEXIS 318, at
*7 (Del.Super.Ct. Aug. 28, 2001)
(upholding conviction of robbery in
the first degree under Delaware
statute providing that defendant must
"display[ ] what appears to be a
deadly weapon" where defendant
wrapped a cloth around his hand so
that it appeared to hide a gun, and
where the victim reasonably believed
that defendant was armed (quotations
and citations omitted)), affd, 790
A.2d 476 (Del.2002); People v.
Taylor, 245 Mich.App. 293, 628
N.W.2d 55, 57, 61 (2001) (stating
"we decline to hold that a defendant
must verbally threaten the victim
with some specific bodily harm in
order to obtain a conviction of armed
robbery" where armed robbery
statute requires robber to be "armed
with a dangerous weapon, or any
article used or fashioned in a manner
to lead the person so assaulted to
reasonably believe it to be a
dangerous weapon");
People v.
Lopez, 135 A.D.2d 443, 522
N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (1987) (holding
that where an unarmed robber holds
his hand in his pocket so as to give
the impression that he is holding a
gun, he has " '[displayed] what
appears to be a firearm' within the
meaning of the [armed robbery]
statute" and "there is no requirement
that the object need be anything
other than the defendant's hand"
(first alteration in original) (quoting
People v. Knowles, 79 A.D.2d 116,
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123, 436 N.Y.S.2d 25 (N.Y.1981))).
**11 Turning to the facts of this case, we
determine that Ireland's gesture of pointing
his hand inside his coat pocket close to his
right side with his elbow extended
constitutes a representation of a dangerous
weapon because such gesture was intended
to look like a gun for the purpose of
influencing Reinkoester to give Ireland all of
the cash in the cash drawer. TFN2]
FN2. Ireland relies heavily upon
State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961
(Utah 1987), where the Utah
Supreme Court held, under a
previous version of the aggravated
robbery statute, that the defendant
did not commit aggravated robbery
where he had his hand in his pocket
held up over the counter as if he had
a gun, and made threats that he
would "blast" people if they did not
cooperate. Id. at 962. The prior
version of the aggravated robbery
statute narrowly defined aggravated
robbery as where the perpetrator
used "a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a
knife or a deadly weapon." Id.;
Utah Code Ami. § 76- 6-302 (1978).
The court held that the "[defendant's
menacing gesture accompanied by
verbal threats is not sufficient
evidence alone to establish the use of
a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm.
To hold otherwise would pervert the
language of section 76-6-302 and
erode the statutory distinction
between robbery and aggravated
robbery." Id. at 965. However, since
the Suniville decision, the Utah
Legislature amended the aggravated
robbery statute to include not only a
"facsimile"
but
also
a

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

113 P.3d 1028
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(Cite as: 113 P.3d 1028, 2005 UT App 209)

Page 5

"representation" of "any item capable
of causing death or serious bodily
injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1601(5)(a),(b)(2004).

interpreted the aggravated robbery and
dangerous weapon statutes and uphold
Ireland's conviction for aggravated robbery.
Accordingly, we affirm.

*1031 **12 Moreover, we determine that
Reinkoester reasonably believed that the
"item [was] intended to cause death or
serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. §
76-l-601(5)(b)(i) (2004).
Reinkoester
testified that he feared that if he did not
comply with Ireland's request, he may be
shot. Guns by their very nature are capable
of causing death or serious bodily injury.
Reinkoester's belief was based not only on
the subjective belief that he thought Ireland
had a gun, but also on objective evidence.
Reinkoester saw something "pointing at
[him]" inside Ireland's coat pocket. That
something "looked like a gun." This is
sufficient objective evidence to support a
reasonable belief that one might have been
injured if he or she did not comply. See,
e.g., Parker v. State. 271 Ark. 84, 607
S.W.2d 378. 379 (1980) (holding that
victim's subjective apprehension coupled
with defendant's objective conduct was
sufficient to sustain a conviction of
aggravated robbery); Faulkner v. State, 260
Ga.App. 794, 581 S.E.2d 365. 367 (2003)
(determining that victim had "reasonable
apprehension" where defendant used his
hand covered with a sock to look like a gun
and pressed it against victim's back); People
v. Taylor. 245 Mich.App. 293. 628 N.W.2d
55, 61 (2001) (holding there was ample
objective evidence that defendant either had
a gun or simulated one so as to deliberately
lead complainant to "reasonably believe" he
had a gun where defendant "placed his hand
inside his jacket and into the front of his
pants").

**14 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS
and NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judges.
113 P.3d 1028, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 28,
2005 UT App 209
END OF DOCUMENT

CONCLUSION
**13 We hold that the trial court correctly
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

